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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Criminal Law
NARCOTICS PROSECUTION - INDICTMENTS AND
BILLS OF PARTICULARS
Introduction
The vast number of prosecutions under narcotic legislative regulation
is appalling, and the large number of these cases which have been
appealed upon the insufficiency of the indictment or refusal of a bill of
particulars is significant. There are two main federal statutes, the Nar-
cotic Drugs Import and Export Act' and the Harrison Narcotic Law.2
In addition, all of the states have some statutory regulation of the pos-
session or sale of drugs, forty-three of these through the Uniform
Narcotic Drug Act.3
Those cases appealed upon the insufficiency of the indictment or
refusal of a bill of particulars comprise the subject of this discussion.
Our purpose is to examine these cases and determine, if possible, the
principles controlling this field.
Indictments
The case of Wong Tai v. United States,4 is probably the outstanding
case on federal indictments of narcotic offenders. In this case one sees
the broad general principles which govern the sufficiency of all such
indictments. The court stated therein: 5
... it is essential to the validity of an indictment under the Federal Con-
stitution [Sixth Amendment] and laws that it shall advise the defendant
of the nature and cause of the accusation in order that he may meet it and
prepare for trial and, after judgment, be able to plead the record and judg-
ment in bar of a further prosecution for the same offense....
The principles present in federal indictments are also generally followed
by the states, both in their indictments and informations. The view of the
California court is typical: 6
An information is formally sufficient if, in substance, it charges the
defendant with the commission of a public offense in words "sufficient to
give the accused notice of the offense of which he is accused .... [so as
1 42 STAT. 596, (1922), as amended, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 171-185 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
2 53 STAT. 269, 382 (1939), as amended, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 2550-2565, 3220-3228
(Cum. Supp. 1953).
3 Exceptions: Kansas, New Hampshire, California, Massachusetts, and Penn-
sylvania, the latter three of which seem to have effective regulation of some other
sort. Alaska, District of Columbia, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico also follow the Uni-
form Narcotic Drug Act.
4 273 U.S. 77 (1927).
5 Id. at 80-1. Accord, United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 288 (1922).
6 People v. Braddock, 264 P.2d 521, 524 (Cal. 1953), citing People v. Williams,
27 Cal.2d 220, 163 P.2d 692, 695 (1945).
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not] to mislead the accused in preparing his defense, or . . . likely to place
him in second jeopardy for the same offense." [citations omitted]
The object of this investigation is to particularize from this broad
demand in order to show how courts have in fact pin-pointed certain
specific requisites as they appear in most indictments. These require-
ments will vary with the cases, depending upon the nature of the crime
and the amount of evidence the prosecution has accumulated.
Where the crime charged is the sale of narcotics, time may or may not
be of the essence of the offense. If time is of the essence, it must be
formally alleged,7 although a slight variance in the proof will be toler-
ated.8 Specification of the time of the offense is therefore the initial
general element of an indictment.
Where the indictment charged "on or about" the 28th day of March,
1952, the court sustained the indictment, pointing out that the words "on
or about" indicate a certain date with approximate accuracy.9 All that is
necessary is that the time be described in unmistakable terms and under
the particular circumstances, to acquaint the defendant with the charge
against him.10 When a witness states a date or dates as those on which
the defendant made sales and these dates are within a few weeks of one
another and of the indictment dates, the court said such dates were sub-
stantially similar and the indictment remained valid despite the vari-
ance." In a case where the appellant contended that the count failed to
allege the time of the crime, the court denied this objection by saying
that questions of this type are no longer open for judicial consideration.' 2
However, the court may go to extremes to uphold an indictment which is
far from specific as to time. Thus, where the allegation of the date of
unlawful importation and sale was stated as July 1, 1913 to June 10,
1931, the court stated that the allegation was cured "if cure be needed,"
by a bill of particulars. The court intimated that in some circumstances
even an indictment charging importation and sale over a period of eigh-
teen years might not be held invalid.13
Another element necessary for a valid indictment is an allegation of
the place of the offense.1 4 However, an indictment alleging the accused
concealed narcotics ". . . at the Southern District of New York and
within the jurisdiction of this court," was upheld as valid against a
7 Shiflett v. State, 67 So.2d 284, 285 (Ala. 1953).
8 United States v. Gaag, 237 Fed. 728, 730-1 (D. Mont. 1916).
9 Shiflett v. State, 67 So.2d 284, 286 (Ala. 1953).
10 Hood v. United States, 76 F.2d 275, 276 (10th Cir. 1935).
11 United States v. Tramaglino, 197 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1952).
12 Fiddelke v. United States, 47 F.2d 751, 752 (9th Cir. 1931). Accord, Parma-
gani v. United States, 42 F.2d 721, 722 (9th Cir. 1930).
13 Jindra v. United States, 69 F.2d 429, 430 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 651
(1934).
14 Miller v. United States, 288 Fed. 816, 817 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 262 U.S.
758 (1923).
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charge of generality. The court suggested that if the defendant had any
doubts, he should seek a bill of particulars.' 5 The statement of the place
of the sale of narcotics need only be clear and definite enough to put the
accused on notice.' 6
A third requirement in many instances is the identity of the purchaser,
if known, or if unknown, then a count alleging a sale made to a person
unknown.. 7 But the requirement is not so stringent as to invalidate an
indictment which incorrectly named the party with whom the accused
dealt. Passing upon the particular circumstances of the case, the court
stated that "the important allegations were those relating to time, place
and acts." 18 Where the indictment alleged the violation in general terms
and did not name the purchaser nor the person to whom the drugs were
delivered, the court nevertheless held the indictment sufficient and stated
that if the accused wished more specific information he should seek same
by a bill of particulars.19
If the statute prohibits dealing in narcotics, the question arises as to
who is a dealer. In resolving this query, the United States Court of the
Eighth Circuit pointed out: 20 "It is not necessary to set out in the indict-
ment how many sales were made to constitute one a dealer." It is enough
that they had sold narcotics indiscriminately and stood ready and willing
to sell to anyone applying to purchase.
In a case commenting on all three of the elements discussed so far, the
court pointed out that the accused "unlawfully, willfully, knowingly, and
feloniously sold a certain quantity ... of opium to a named person at a
designated place, and on a fixed date," whereupon the indictment was
held valid as charging in clear, definite, and in unmistakable language the
statutory crime.21 This view, as shown by the cases, is shared by the
courts where the accused is not subjected to surprise nor generality in the
indictment.
Scienter is another fundamental frequently mentioned as necessary in
the indictment, depending upon the nature of the offense. Accordingly,
in charging conspiracy to violate a narcotics statute, the Supreme Court
set down the principle that "certainty, to a common intent, sufficient to
identify the offense which the defendants conspired to commit, is all that
15 United States v. Busch, 64 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1933). See Dunbar v. United
States, 156 U.S. 185 (1895).
16 Hood v. United States, 76 F.2d 275, 276 (10th Cir. 1935).
17 Ong v. United States, 131 F.2d 175, 176 (4th Cir. 1942). Accord, United States
v. Brandenburg, 155 F.2d 110, 112 (Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 769 (1947),
aff'd, 162 F.2d 980 (Cir.).
18 Ferrari v. United States, 169 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1948).
10 Ong v. United States, 131 F.2d 175, 176 (4th Cir. 1942).
20 Taylor v. United States, 19 F.2d 813, 815-6 (8th Cir. 1927).
21 Hood v. United States, 76 F.2d 275, 276 (10th Cir. 1935).
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is requisite ... ., 22 However, where a statute does not make intent or
knowledge an essential factor of the particular crime, it is not necessary
to allege such intent in the indictment.23 From these cases, it may be said
that only where the intent is a necessary element of the offense itself, as
in the case of conspiracy, will it be essential to allege intent in the
indictment.
Another ground upon which an indictment might be attacked concerns
a situation where the indictment incorporates the words of the statute
into the body of the indictment. Generally, allegations made in the lang-
uage of the statute are sufficient,24 but the degree of exactness required
in the repetition is not settled. The court does not demand absolute
repetition of the terms of the statute. For example, where a statute de-
nounces several acts as a crime and connects them with the disjunctive
"or," the pleader in drawing an indictment connected such elements by
the conjunctive "and," the indictment so drawn is not bad for duplicity.25
By the Harrison Act,26 a sale of drugs by a person registered to handle
narcotics is not a crime even though such sale is made in an unstamped
package; it is a crime, nevertheless, for a sale to be made in and from an
unstamped package. An indictment was held invalid for the reason that,
in addition to charging that the sale was made "in" the original package,
it failed to charge that the sale was not made "from" an original package.
The court pointed out that "If the negation of an exception in the enact-
ing clause of a statute is essential to accurately describe the offense, then
the accusations of the indictment must show that the accused is not
within the exception." 27
According to the same Act,28 it is an offense to dispense drugs except
on order forms. An exception to this requirement is a physician, who. is
exempt from this regulation while in the course of his professional prac-
tice. Where a physician violates his privilege and dispenses drugs outside
professional treatment, the indictment must first state the general offense
and then must also negate the exception thereto pertaining to physicians.
Such was done in Glatzmayer v. United States,29 and the indictment was
22 Wong Tai v. Uiiited States, 273 U.S. 77, 81 (1927), citing Williamson v. Uni-
ted States, 207 U.S. 425, 447 (1908).
23 United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-2 (1922). Accord, United States v.
Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 288 (1922).
24 Freeman v. United States, 86 F.2d 243, 244 (5th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299
U.S. 616 (1937). Ex parte Keel, 62 Okla. Cr. 277, 71 P.2d 313, 315 (1937) (informa-
tion held sufficient).
25 O'Neill v. United States, 19 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1927). Accord, United States v.
Lee Foo Yung, 46 F. Supp. 147, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
26 53 STAT. 269, 271 (1939), as amended, 26 U.S.CA. § 2553 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
27 Weare v. United States, 1 F.2d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 1924).
28 Harrison Act, 53 STAT. 269, 271 (1939), as amended, 60 STAT. 39, 26 U.S.C.
2551 (a) 1946.
29 84 F.2d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1936). Ratigan v. United States, 88 F.2d 919, 922
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 705 (1937).
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held valid. Referring to this same point, a district court held that an
indictment failing to negate the exception in favor of a physician acting
professionally was insufficient because the exception was an essential
adjunct of the offense, and therefore, the Government had the burden of
negating this exception in the indictment. 30
Ordinarily, a slight variance between the statute and the indictment
is upheld. An example of this proposition is a case where an indictment
charging that a sale of narcotics was not made by a written order on a
form issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, where the Act 31
required that such form be issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, was
held not to be defective.3 2 The reason stated was that there was no
chance that such allegations would subject the appellant to another trial,
nor mislead him in preparing his defense. A further instance where a
slight divergence from the terms of the statute did not invalidate the
indictment was the use of the words "not in the original stamped
package" which satisfied the statutory offense of selling narcotics "except
in the original stamped package or from the original stamped pack-
age." 33 On the other hand, where the indictment charged the defendant
with issuing, writing, or delivering prescriptions as a physician, and the
statutory offense prohibited only the sale, barter, or distribution of drugs,
the court held this to be a material variance from the words of the statute
and that no crime was alleged and the indictment was therefore invalid.
3 4
Bills of Particulars
Having discussed somewhat at length the nature of an indictment or
information in the prosecution of a narcotic crime, attention is now
turned to its counterpart, the bill of particulars. It will be recalled that
often in upholding the particular indictment in question, the court sug-
gested that the defendant might petition for a bill of particulars if he
considered it necessary for his defense. The survey now centers upon
those factors which will determine the probability of such petition being
successful.
30 United States v. Hammers, 241 Fed. 542, 544 (S.D. Fla. 1917). Accord,
Mitchell v. United States, 3 F.2d 514, 515 (6th Cir. 1925). While acknowledging that
it is the usual and better practice where it is alleged that the defendant is a physician,
to also allege that he dispensed drugs not in good faith in the course of his pro-
fessional practice, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit, later applying
the same statute, held that "in a prosecution under this section of the Act it is un-
necessary to plead the exceptions to the statute." Nigro v. United States, 117 F.2d
624, 629 (8th Cir. 1941) ; Haggerty v. United States, 52 F.2d 11, 12 (8th Cir. 1931);
Boehm v. United States, 21 F.2d 283, 284 (8th Cir. 1927).
31 50 STAT. 551, 554 (1937), as amended, 26 U.S.C.A. § 2591 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
32 Kinnison v. United States, 158 F.2d 403 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330
U.S. 834 (1947).
33 Randolph v. United States, 165 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
34 Aiton v. United States, 3 F.2d 992, (9th Cir. 1925).
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A bill of particulars is sought when, although the indictment is suffi-
cient as against a general demurrer, the accused desires more specific
information of the charge against him.35 A bill cannot, however, cure a
defective indictment or information. 36 Its purpose is to further apprise the
defendant as to the nature of his alleged crime and to guard against the
surprise introduction of evidence for which he has not been able to pre-
pare. It has been pointed out:
3 7
Where an indictment ... cannot be pronounced bad on motion to quash
or demurrer, and yet is couched in such language that the accused is liable
to be surprised by the production of evidence for which he is unprepared,
his remedy is a bill of particulars.
The request for the bill must not in itself be too general, too vague, or
too broad3 8 The request must be in the form of a sufficient, formal, and
timely demand for a bill, and, therefore, a decision will not be overthrown
when there has been no formal request made by the defense at the open-
ing of the trial.39 To constitute a valid motion for a bill, an allegation must
be included that the information is needed to breach a void which if not
remedied will comprise a handicap in his defense.40 Conversely, where
the indictment makes charges as fully as is necessary to enable the
accused to prepare his defense, and surprise is unlikely, the motion for a
bill of particulars will be overruled.4 ' Since from this, the motion is
within the discietion of the trial judge, a denial thereof generally will not
be reversed. 42
The point made that the plea to grant a bill of particulars is addressed
to the discretionary powers of the court is the very crux of the matter.
The court may consider all the circumstances of the case, and applying
the general principles outlined herein, exercise its soundest judgment in
granting or refusing the bill.43 Probably the clearest statement of this
proposition is to be found in an early Florida case:4
Such an application or motion [for a bill of particulars in a criminal
case], however, is not founded upon a legal right, but is a matter resting
within the sound judicial discretion of the court, depending entirely upon
the nature and circumstances of each particular case as they appear to the
court before whom the trial is had; and the refusal of the trial judge to
35 Ong v. United States, 131 F.2d 175, 176 (4th Cir. 1942); Nigro v. United
States, 117 F.2d 624, 631 (8th Cir. 1941).
36 State v. Pettifield, 210 La. 609, 27 So.2d 424, 427 (1946).
37 O'Neill v. United States, 19 F.2d 322, 324 (8th Cir. 1927).
38 Vogt v. United States, 156 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 1946).
39 Martin v. United States, 20 F.2d 785, 786 (6th Cir. 1927).
40 Hood v. United States, 76 F.2d 275, 276 (10th Cir. 1935). Accord, Vogt v.
United States, 156 F.2d 308, 309-310 (5th Cir. 1946).
41 Ginsberg v. United States, 96 F.2d 433, 435 (5th Cir. 1938).
42 Taylor v. United States, 19 F.2d 813, 816 (8th Cir. 1927).
43 Fiddelke v. United States, 47 F.2d 751, 752 (9th Cir. 1931).
44 Mathis v. State, 45 Fla. 46, 34 So. 287, 291 (1903).
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grant said motion will not be disturbed or reversed by an appellate court
unless there was an abuse of such discretion.
The appellate courts are most reluctant to reverse a refusal of a bill
unless there is a clear abuse of discretion upon the record. 45 The reason-
ing, as with all similar matters, is that the trial judge is in a much better
position to observe the general demeanor of the defendant as well as the
genuineness of his surprise or inability to prepare his defense. Therefore,
to provide the basis for an appeal, actual surprise on the part of the
appellants must be discernible upon the record.46
The party defendant may not, moreover, use this protective device as
an artifice to garner information by which he might procedurally upset
the state's case. Thus, a bill will not be granted when it is the accused's
purpose to establish a basis on which he might make a motion to quash or
to subsequently raise a question of admissibility of evidence, for example,
that such evidence was procured from the residence of the accused with-
out a search warrant.47
One of the reasons most consistently given for refusing a bill of par-
ticulars is that the prosecution is under no duty to disclose the actual
evidence on which it will rely but only its limits. 48 Nor must there be
exposure to entrapment into making extended allegations which will be
impossible to prove.4 9
Without a doubt the classic case on the subject is the Supreme Court
decision, Wong Tai v. United States, discussed supra. Weighing the scope
of the request, the discovery of evidence, the actual surprise of the de-
fendant, and the wide discretion of the trial court, the Court held that a
bill was properly refused, and said: 5 0
The defendant also made a motion, supported by affidavit, for a detailed
bill of particulars, setting forth with particularity the specific facts in
reference to the several overt acts alleged in the indictment, with various
specifications as to times, places, names of persons, quantities, prices, con-
tainers, buildings, agencies, instrumentalities, etc., and the manner in which
and the specific circumstances under which they were committed. This
motion - which in effect sought a complete discovery of the Government's
case in reference to the overt acts - was denied on the ground that the
indictment was sufficiently definite in view of the unknown matters in-
volved and the motion called "for too much details of evidence."
The application for the bill of particulars was one addressed to the
sound discretian of the court, and, there being no abuse of this discretion,
its action thereon should not be disturbed. [citations omitted] And there
45 Hood v. United States, 78 F.2d 150, 152 (10th Cir. 1935); Hood v. United
States, 76 F.2d 275, 276 (10th Cir. 1935).
46 Chadwick v. United States, 117 F.2d 902, 904 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S.
585 (1941).
47 State v. Alvarez, 182 La. 908, 162 So. 725, 726 (1935).
48 Hood v. United States, 76 F.2d 275, 276 (10th Cir. 1935).
49 Lett v. United States, 15 F.2d 686, 688-9 (8th Cir. 1926).
50 Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77, 82 (1927).
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is nothing in the record indicating that the defendant was taken by surprise
in the progress of the trial, or that his substantial rights were prejudiced
in any way by the refusal to require the bill of particulars.
From these cases it can be concluded that when the crime charged is
the possession or sale of narcotics, both offenses being by their very
nature continuing crimes, there arises a particular need for specification
of the time of the act charged. The reason for this need is the great
possibility of the ultimate prosecution for a separate offense, which
offense the defendant might disclose in attempting to muster a defense
for the violation actually charged. It seems reasonable that when the
circumstances are such that actual doubt beseiges the defendant and the
possibility of a second suit for the same act ensues, the bill will be
granted.
It is not clear what degree of exactness as to the date or dates of the
alleged offense need be given. Approximate dates, within reason, have
regularly been upheld in an indictment and it does not appear that judi-
cial discretion would demand a stricter rule in the case of a bill of
particulars.51 In one case, where the original indictment alleged con-
tinued sale over a period of eighteen years, the government in their bill
chose to specify exactly one particular day of the offense.52 But on the
other hand the prosecution need not offer this precise information when
it does not in fact have it or when to do so would disclose its case where
in fact the defendant has enough information to prepare his defense. 3
The same factors apply when determining if the place of the sale or
storage need be disclosed upon motion for a bill. Although where infor-
mation is not known to the prosecution it cannot be tendered, when,
however, it does appear from testimony that such knowledge was had by
the government, it is error to refuse the bill. 4
Another area which may occasion requests for a bill is the means of
perpetration of the crime, i.e., in what specific manner the alleged sale
was made. When there is some actual doubt as to this matter, and when
the other general requirements are adequately fulfilled, it is believed that
a bill describing the means of commission of the crime should be set out.
However, as a practical matter, much of this information is already with-
in the knowledge of the defendant, and it is questionable whether he
could be able to show actual surprise.
The cases demonstrate but a single side of the question. Again, as a
matter of practice, few appeals are made by the prosecution when a bill
51 Fiddelke v. United States, 47 F.2d 751, 752 (9th Cir. 1931); O'Neil v. United
States, 19 F.2d 322, 324 (8th Cir. 1927).
52 Jindra v. United States, 69 F.2d 429, 430 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 292 U.S.
651 (1934).
53 Lett v. United States, 15 F.2d 686, 688 (8th Cir. 1926). See also Hood v.
United States, 76 F.2d 275, 276 (10th Cir. 1935).
54 Lett v. United States, 15 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1926).
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is ordered, and, therefore, the cases reported are only those appealed by
the defendant. It is far more expedient to surrender the information than
to spend considerable time and money in appealing from a grant by the
court. On the other hand, the defendant will seek even the most insignifi-
cant flaw simply to delay, if not to overthrow, conviction.
Conclusion
In a recent case, reversing a conviction based upon a defective indict-
ment, the court ruled:"
The Constitution requires that the accused be informed "of the nature
and cause of the accusation" (Amendment VI), and the cases interpret
that to mean that he must be so definitely informed as to be enabled to
present his defense. The test, say the courts, is whether the accused was
misled.
As we have seen, this deception or misunderstanding may be occasion-
ed by any one of several factors. If time should be of the essence of the
crime, then the time of the purported offense must be stated, at least
approximately. Furthermore, if the crime was the sale of narcotics, the
place of the sale and the purchaser should also be alleged when known.
In addition, scienter, if an element of the statutory crime, must be
alleged. In a given case, any or all of the above allegations may be
demanded in an indictment in order to enable the defendant to adequate-
ly prepare his defense.
A sufficient description of the offense is usually present when the
indictment follows the words of the statute. While the courts are not at
all in agreement as to what degree of duplication will be demanded in the
repetition of the statutory terms, it is noticeable that the trend is to a
more liberal view. What is required in an indictment is that it be a "rea-
sonable, not absolute or impracticable, particularity of statement." Other-
wise the rules of pleading would not serve their true purpose - to con-
vict the guilty and to shield the innocent. 56
In sustaining the indictment in a specific case, the court often may
further state that if the accused still has any actual doubt of the charge
against him, he may request a bill of particulars. The bill is not intended
to cure a defective indictment, but only to give additional information
where it is particularly needed to construct a defense. Actual doubt or
surprise is necessary and generally this is only present when the crime is
of a continuing nature, and when, therefore, there exists the hazard of a
prosecution at a later date for a second violation disclosed at the trial.
But a bill cannot be employed to ferret out the substantive details of the
prosecution's evidence.
55 Hallman v. United States, 208 F.2d 825, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
56 Lett v. United States, 15 F.2d 686, 689 (1926).
